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Abstract 
Poor response capacity has been identified as a major inhibitor for successful post tsunami 
recovery attempts in Sri Lanka. Despite level of incentives aid and help which have been 
received from the international communities, both governmental and nongovernmental 
organisations, have evidently failed to deliver expected levels of performance in post tsunami 
recovery activities. It is of utmost importance to identify and overcome the related capacity gaps 
if Sri Lanka is ever to recover from the December 2004 devastation and any future disasters. 
Within the light of this, as the first step towards recovery, the country must fully understand the 
nature and scale of its capacity gaps related to the post disaster recovery. 
Addressing this issue, the EURASIA (European and Asian Infrastructure Advantage) 
international collaborative research programme has conducted a series of interviews with key 
personnel in Sri Lanka to explore the nature and magnitude of this problem. The main objective 
of this paper is to present the outcome of these key expert interviews highlighting the priority 
attention areas and possible actions towards minimising the post tsunami recovery capacity gaps 
in Sri Lanka. 
Keywords: Capacity building, Disaster management, Developing countries, Post disaster 
reconstruction, Long term recovery. 
1. Background 
1.1 Disasters and the developing world 
During the past decade, the number of worldwide disasters has risen sharply. The Annual 
Disaster Statistical Review 2006 [1] highlights that the number of natural disasters that occurred 
in the period 1991 to 1999 varied between 200-250, while the figures have almost doubled 
during the period 2000 and 2006. Despite the continuous and rapid growth in the number of 
natural disasters, the number of actual victims affected by disasters has varied considerably 
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along the timeline and across regions. During the last two decades, the average annual number 
of victims affected by natural disasters ranged between 100,000,000 to 300,000,000 [1].  
Further, the Asian continent has experienced the greatest loss of life in absolute terms and in 
proportion to the population, due to natural disasters. As CRED [2] reports, the figures 
accounted for an average of  83.7% people killed in natural disasters in Asia, compared to 
Europe (10.55%), America (3.54%), Africa (2.16%) and Oceania (0.05%) during the period 
2000-2005.  
Within these fatality rates, a significantly higher number of death tolls is evident in developing 
countries compared to the developed countries [3, 4]. For an example, the earthquake which hit 
central California in 2003 with a magnitude of 6.5 on the Richter scale, took two lives and 
injured 40 people [5] whereas the earthquake which hit Iran four days later with a magnitude of 
6.6 killed at least 26,000 people [5]. As one would suspect, this immense difference in the death 
toll is not uniquely related to factors such as population densities, as both events took place in 
areas with high-density populations. Not only do developing countries experience higher levels 
of mortality during a disaster, they generally require longer periods for post disaster recovery. 
Within a typical disaster management scenario, 4 distinguishable stages exist [4]. Those are: 
1. Pre-disaster planning 
2. Immediate relief 
3. Transitional phase 
4. Medium/Long term recovery 
Within the pre-disaster planning stage, the vulnerable counties prepare strategies and plans of 
actions to meet the demands of the future disasters. Just after the disaster itself, the immediate 
relief stage starts, within which the focus is on providing immediate relief to the victims. Often 
during this stage, the disaster receives the maximum attention from relief agencies and media 
exposing the affected communities to possible routes of obtaining required resources and help. 
After the immediate relief phase, the affected communities often go through a transitional 
period between the aftermaths of the disaster and their normal way of life. However, without a 
proper medium/long term plan for the recovery, the affected communities will experience a 
prolonged transitional period leading to an unsettled society. 
As the “Mind the gap” report [4] highlights, even though the developing countries often receive 
financial and other humanitarian support from international communities, nongovernmental 
organisations and donor agencies as immediate relief aid, generally long-term recovery has 
primarily been identified as a national, sub-national and local government-led matter. As such, 
traditionally the donors and other organisations working towards humanitarian relief pay less 
attention to the long term recovery aspect of disaster management. Thus, not surprisingly, 
developing countries who witness disasters, often fail to launch successful long term disaster 
recovery programmes especially due to lack of resources and capacities, both in financial and 
intellectual terms.  Consequently, this inability hinders the value of the resources dispersed and 
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services rendered by the donor agencies within the immediate relief stage. For these reasons, 
there is a need to assess the long term disaster recovery issues in developing countries. 
1.2 The case of post tsunami Sri Lanka 
The case of post tsunami Sri Lanka exemplifies the issues related to the post disaster long term 
recovery in developing countries. Sri Lanka is a small island situated close to southern tip of 
India near the equator. It is a developing country with the total population just over 20 million. 
Before the Indian Ocean Tsunami, Sri Lanka was known to be a safe haven where outrages of 
nature scarcely occurred except for occasional floods and landslides. However, the Tsunami 
affected 75% of the coastline of Sri Lanka. It also resulted in the destruction of more than 
100,000 houses [6] which in turn also resulted in the taking away of several livelihoods such as 
fishing, farming, tourism and handicrafts-related activities. In addition to commercial and non-
commercial property damage, the number of deaths apportioned to the Indian Ocean Tsunami is 
estimated to be in excess of 130,000 with at least 31,000 of those in Sri Lanka [7]. The lack of 
awareness of the nature of a tsunami, among the Sri Lankan public, is quoted as one of the 
reasons for this mammoth death toll [8]. Indeed, the term “Tsunami” was heard by most of the 
ordinary Sri Lankans only after this devastation.  
During the immediate relief stage, Sri Lanka received humanitarian relief aid from donors all 
over the world. This aid was in the form of financial assistance, equipment and materials and 
human resources for rescue/relief missions. While most of the aid was aimed at providing 
immediate relief to the victims, some of the funds were meant to be utilized for long term 
recovery attempts such as reconstruction of houses and infrastructure facilities. 
Four years on, Sri Lanka is yet to recover fully from the devastation of the December 2004 
tsunami. In fact, after a successful immediate relief phase [9], Sri Lanka is going through its 
transitional period between the short term relief and the medium/long term recovery. The Sri 
Lankan government started the long term recovery programmes with optimism and expectations 
for speedy recovery [9]. In fact the government expected the post tsunami recovery programmes 
to be completed within 3-5 years [10]. Further to this optimism, as Weerakoon et al [9] 
highlights there were pronouncements at political level about even speedier recovery intentions, 
such as meeting all permanent housing needs within one year of the devastation. However, this 
target has not been fully met even after three years [9]. 
With reference to the infrastructure, the pace of recovery of larger scale infrastructure projects, 
has reported been slow with an estimated 50% of construction projects yet to commence by end 
2006 [11]. As GOSL [11] highlights, by end 2006, 134 of 182 damaged schools were estimated 
to be in various stages of construction. However, by the end of 2005, construction work had 
started only in 18 schools. Similarly, within the health sector only 55 of a total of 102 damaged 
buildings have been completed by June 2006 [9 cited 12].            
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1.3 Capacity building for post disaster recovery 
From the above figures it is clear that the post tsunami recovery (long term) attempts in Sri 
Lanka were less than successful compared to the government’s expectations and plans. One of 
the problems the governments of developing countries often face, with regards to post disaster 
recovery, is their response capacity. Generally, capacity at local government level to plan and 
implement post disaster recovery strategies is limited and incapacitated as a result of the disaster 
itself. In the light of this, strengthening local capacities for this process has been identified as a 
main priority [10, 13].  
Strengthening national capacities of developing countries towards post disaster recovery 
predominantly demands financial incentives.   Such incentives given by donors during a disaster 
are generally routed towards short term relief efforts rather than long term recovery 
programmes. As a result, the governments of affected countries (specifically developing 
countries) are financially incapable of launching successful long term recovery programmes [4].  
As such, it has been identified within recent reports (e.g. [4, 10]), that the main focus of the 
donor organisations should be to achieve the appropriate balance of fund allocations between 
the immediate/short term relief and the medium/long term recovery. The donor organisations 
such as UN have recently recognised this aspect as a timely priority[10].  
Lack of financial capability is a major contributing factor preventing a county from obtaining 
required physical resources such as equipment and infrastructure to launch successful long term 
post disaster recovery programmes. A lack of appropriate intellectual capacity can be 
recognised as another factor hindering the implementation of successful recovery plans. In this 
scenario, lack of intellectual capacity refers to lack of knowledge, expertise and training related 
to post disaster recovery within the relevant local authorities/institutions. Affected countries 
could be intellectually incapacitated for various reasons and at various levels. The Brain Drain, 
the lack of proper coordination between relevant authorities/institutions and immature 
organisational processes can also be highlighted as behind intellectually incapacitated countries. 
In some instances, mere lack of expectancy can also be a reason for a county to demonstrate 
intellectual incapacity in long term disaster recovery. For example, some of the Sri Lankan 
authorities [13] may have been incapacitated when responding to post tsunami (December 2004) 
recovery attempts due to the fact that Sri Lanka had not experienced a tsunami for centuries and 
there was no reasonably predicted reason for them to be prepared for devastation of that scale. 
Highlighting the importance of improving local capacities in post disaster recovery, various 
reports (e.g. [11, 13, 14]) have highlighted the development of institutional mandates and 
capacities as a key focus area in achieving success in implementing its post tsunami long term 
recovery measures. These reports further acknowledge that identification of the capacity gaps in 
relevant institutions and authorities is a prerequisite placed above the task of developing 
institutional capacities and still very much to be completed along the country’s journey to long 
term recovery from the December 2004 tsunami. In the light of this, this paper addresses the 
following research question: 
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“What priority capacity gaps exist within relevant authorities and institutions in Sri Lanka that 
need to be addressed to achieve successful long term recovery from the December 2004 
tsunami?” 
2. Methodology 
The rest of this paper presents the outcome of an empirical investigation carried out by the 
authors with the intention of addressing this research question. This research work was carried 
out as part of an international collaborative research project, EURASIA. The EURopean and 
ASian Infrastructure Advantage (EURASIA) is a 3 year research collaboration between Europe 
and Asia funded through the ASIA-LINK programme of the European Union. The specific 
objective is to enhance the capacity of the partner institutions for training, teaching and research 
activities required for the creation and long-term management of public and commercial 
facilities and elements of infrastructure associated with post tsunami activities in Sri Lanka. 
The overall approach to this research took the shape of a case study. This helped to meet the 
challenges of the research question being answered, specially to investigate the phenomena 
deeply and thoroughly, within the limited context of post tsunami Sri Lanka. The case study 
approach further supported the exploratory nature of the study where the concepts related to 
questions being answered gradually enriched throughout the investigation. Within this scenario, 
the boundary of the case study was defined as the post-tsunami recovery attempts in Sri Lanka. 
The unit of analysis was defined as the capacity gaps prevailing within the above boundary. The 
study was conducted as a single case study as the phenomena being investigated is unique, 
considering all the economical, cultural and geographical parameters related to the context.      
The data collection approach was centred around a series of semi structured interviews 
conducted with 12 organisations involved in the post tsunami recovery programmes.  These 
organisations were selected based on their level of involvement in the recovery actions in Sri 
Lanka. Main offices of all the organisations selected are based in Colombo, Sri Lanka, while the 
activities carried out by these organisations are geographically widespread to include all the 
Boxing Day tsunami affected areas, including the Eastern part of the island. All the interviews 
were conducted between 1st June 2007 and 30th June 2007, in English. Due to the high 
sensitivity of the issues being discussed, an agreement has been reached between the 
investigator and the organisations involved regarding maintaining the anonymity of the 
participants. For this reason, the true identity of the participating organisations or the 
interviewees has not been revealed within this paper. However, all the personnel interviewed 
within this study are either top level or medium level managers as the information intended to 
collect was of strategic level rather than operational level. During the interviews, information 
about the experiences of the interviewees regarding the successes and failures of the post-
tsunami recovery attempts in Sri Lanka were collected. The interview guide prepared for the 
semi structured interview was structured in such a way that, as the interview progresses, it 
captures the issues related to the failures of recovery attempts and reasons behind success stories 
experienced by the interviewees. The preparation of the interview questions was informed by a 
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literature review to note the capacity gaps already identified within the above context. This 
ensured that this research was not attempting to re invent the wheel.   
All the interviews were transcribed and analysed to identify key capacity gaps that hinder the 
success of post-tsunami recovery in Sri Lanka. The data analysis strategy is based on the 
principles of content analysis where the concepts related to the phenomena are captured through 
analysing the contents of the interviews qualitatively. To ensure all the data captured during the 
data collection stage was treated with care and consistently, the authors used a qualitative data 
analysis tool namely, NVivo (version 7). This is a computer based qualitative data analysis tool 
to help organise and analyse qualitative data systematically and transparently. 
The next section highlights the outcome of the analysis. 
3. Analysis and results  
3.1 The analysis process 
The first step of the analysis was to identify “concepts” which emerged during the interviews. 
For this purpose, the interview transcripts were carefully reviewed by the researchers within 
NVivo while highlighting the main ideas presented by each interviewer for each question asked. 
These “concepts” were then recorded within NVivo as “free nodes”. Within NVivo a free node 
represents an idea that has emerged from a data source (in this instance from an interview 








 Figure 1- Concepts identified from the interviews as free nodes 
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Each of the free nodes identified above are based on comments made by the interviewees. While 
identifying these key concepts as free nodes, NVivo keeps a track of references about which 
interviewee(s) commented about the concept, and on how many occasions. There were instances 
where the same concept has been referred to by several interviewees more than one time. For 
example, lack of planning skills was identified as a capacity gap in 5 occasions by 2 
interviewees during the interviews. During the first part of the analysis, these concepts were 
recorded in free nodes to ensure all collected data was considered in the analysis.  The second 
stage of analysis focused on identifying how these initial concepts map together to answer the 
research question. 
During the second stage of analysis, the initial concepts were mapped with the various aspects 
of the research question being answered. While the main aim of this research was to identify the 
main capacity gaps in post tsunami recovery Sri Lanka, the interview guidelines have been 
prepared to capture various elements of the main issue. For an example, the interviewees were 
motivated to talk about the capturing post tsunami recovery capacity gaps in Sri Lanka in four 
main areas. Those areas are: 
1. Financing 
2. Human resources 
3. Institutional (both governmental and non governmental) 
4. Skills References 
Determination of these four areas is based on the outcome of a literature review, where the key 
elements of post disaster capacity gaps have been discussed based on previous work in the field. 
This discussion is considered to be outside of the purpose of this paper and is being prepared to 
be presented elsewhere.          
Further, during the interview process the interviewees were guided towards revealing possible 
causes for capacity gaps and possible solutions to overcome them. For example, with the help of 
the focus of the interview guideline, the initial concepts identified in the first stage of the 
analysis could be converted into a grouped layout, which gives a clearer image about how those 
concepts map with the research question being answered. In NVivo this grouping of concepts 
can be presented as “tree nodes”. With the creation of these tree nodes, some key “themes” 















In addition to this “grouping”, the researchers identified “relationships” within and between the 
concepts and themes. These relationships lead to present the identified capacity gaps with 
causal-effect explanations. The identified concepts, key themes and relationships were then 
modelled using NVivo to understand and represent the results more thoroughly. The next 
section discusses the results of the analysis in more detail with the help of the models. 
3.2 Results                
As discussed above, within this research, the capacity gaps in post tsunami Sri Lanka have been 
investigated in four main areas. The rest of the paper discusses the results of the empirical 
investigation with reference to these areas of capacity gaps. Further, under each area the results 
will be discussed with the aim of answering the research question “what are the main capacity 
gaps identifiable within Sri Lanka while attempting to recover from the devastation of the 
December 2004 tsunami?” Additionally, the causes and effects related to  the identified capacity 





Figure 2 - Key themes organised as tree nodes 
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3.2.1 Capacity gaps related to skills shortages and human resources 
 
During the interviews, skills shortage has emerged as a main capacity gap in post tsunami Sri 
Lanka. In fact 18 references were made by the interviewers in 9 occasions about various skills 
shortages as capacity gaps. As illustrated within the Figure 3 above, 6 main skills areas that 
require capacity enhancements have been identified from the research. These are: 
1. Coordination skills 
2. Management skills 
3. Planning skills 
4. Research skills 
5. Technical skills 
6. Training skills 
Out of these capacity gaps in skills; coordination, management and planning have been 
identified as key areas of concern. Post disaster recovery attempts in general require a great deal 
of coordination between various parties, planning of appropriate actions and management of the 
work. Within the context of this research, the interviewees highlighted significant gaps in the 
above areas including the requirements capture actions to resettlements. For an example, during 
the interview, one interviewee pointed out that post tsunami housing reconstruction work in 
some areas do not appeal to the affected communities as the houses are constructed without 
giving much attention to the infrastructure availability within the area. In another interview, the 
same point was raised and highlighted the fact that some of the affected communities are not 
willing to be settled in the newly built areas as they were constructed without giving due 
consideration to the livelihoods of the affected communities (e.g. fishermen are reluctant to be 
relocated away from the coastal area). This highlights that the relevant authorities have not 
Figure 3 - Skills shortage as a capacity gap - links and relationships 
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demonstrated required planning, coordination and management skills within the context of post 
tsunami recovery in Sri Lanka. Highlighting a planning issue, one interviewee commented that 
there is a visible lack of persistent long term strategy to implement the post tsunami recovery 
actions in Sri Lanka. For example, the interviewee pointed out that the government had to 
change its position on the costal buffer zone consistently to address the issues such as the 
community pressure. Had this strategy been reviewed thoroughly before the decision, the 
actions could have been implemented more successfully. These issues are not visible only in 
government authorities. In fact the interviewers have highlighted that fact that these issues exist 
in government authorities, donor agencies as well as in NGOs who are involved in post tsunami 
recovery actions. This issue will further be discussed under the section 3.2.2 below.  
In addition to the skills gaps identified above, the capacity gaps in research and training have 
also been identified as shortcomings to implement successful post tsunami recovery actions. In 
terms of the capacity gaps in research, the interviewees felt that in general, the research 
activities are under-funded in Sri Lanka. Some interviewees specifically identified that disaster 
management research and training activities in Sri Lanka were not especially strong before the 
tsunami. Even though there is evidence to support improved research and training activities 
related to disaster management recently, interviewers raised their concerned about the current 
research and training capacities in Sri Lanka to deal with the demands of post tsunami recovery 
activities. 
It has also been identified that some of the required technical skills for post disaster recovery in 
Sri Lanka are lacking. Interviewees commented especially about the shortage of construction 
technical skills in post tsunami Sri Lanka to cater for the massive demand created with the start 
of the post tsunami reconstruction work. As an example, two interviewees mentioned that 
labour rates in construction has risen sharply recently, demonstrating a shortage in skilled 
labour. Further, particular emphasis has been drawn to the fact that there are tsunami affected 
areas where the security problems exist due to the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka. Due to the 
reluctance of skilled construction workers to work in these areas, a prominent technical skills 
shortage exists.  
As mentioned above, these skills shortages are not limited to one particular organisation, group 
or sector. Rather these have been identified in various authorities and institutions that perform 
main roles in post tsunami recovery activities in Sri Lanka. As such, the next section discusses 














Figure 4 above highlights the key institutional and financial capacity gaps and causal – effects 
relationships identified within the context of the research. Primarily, the institutional capacity 
gaps have been identified within two main groups of organisations involved within the post 
tsunami recovery context. These are: 
1. Governmental organisations – These are the government owned organisations that 
carries the authority and responsibility for the overall post tsunami recovery strategies 
and actions. 
2. Non-governmental organisations – These are the organisations that are involved within 
the post tsunami recovery process, outside the governmental direct control.              
Out of these two groups, governmental organisations have been the most cited with relation to 
the areas of lack of institutional capacity in implementing post tsunami recovery actions. In fact, 
8 areas of concerns have been cited by the interviewees in 16 instances, through 21 references. 
The areas of concern are: 
• Lack of central statistics 
• Lack of experience 
• Lack of good practice transfer 
• Lack of incentives 
• Lack of planning 
• Lack of communication 
Figure 4 - Institutional capacity gaps identified within post tsunami Sri Lanka 
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• Poor quality assurance 
• Poor requirements capture 
Out of these areas, lack of planning and poor communication has been cited frequently by the 
interviewees. This coincides with the discussion presented within the section 3.2.1 above, where 
these have been identified as the main capacity gaps related to the required skills. In addition 
poor quality assurance has been identified as an area where the government institutions show 
significant capacity gaps. For example, one interviewee highlighted that, despite the existing 
policies about construction quality, the houses constructed and allocated for effected 
communities varies significantly in terms of their quality, questioning the capacity of authorities 
to check and enforce the expected quality levels. During the investigation it was identified that 
the lack of experience to deal with the scale of the December 2004 tsunami was a main cause 
for the governmental organisations to demonstrate capacity gaps in various areas. For example, 
during the last 2 centuries Sri Lanka had not experienced a tsunami on any scale. This fact itself 
justifies, to a certain extent, why Sri Lankan governmental organisations were not able to handle 
a post disaster recovery attempt of this scale. Furthermore, this leads to the fact that the country 
is not ready with required central statistics to effectively handle the demands of this recovery 
attempt. One interviewee commented that the number of constructed houses in one of the 
relocation areas is greater than the affected communities in the surrounding. This highlights that 
the planning and requirement capture capacities of the relevant authorities were not optimal in 
this particular instance, and at the same time it highlights the issue of lack of central statistics 
about those affected.  
From the non-governmental organisations’ (NGOs) point of view, the institutional capacity gaps 
have been identified in two perspectives. The NGOs operate in post tsunami Sri Lanka under 
two capacities; as donors and implementers. From the donor’s perspective, a number of 
interviewees have mentioned their rigid policies and decision making capacities on funds 
disbursement as a main capacity gap. As the interviewers pointed out, most of the time, the 
donors are less flexible with funds disbursement. Most donors prefer to fund short term relief 
actions and allow fewer funds for long term recovery actions. And often the donors were 
criticised for being over ambitious leading problems in implementing recovery actions. These 
gaps have been identified not only as the capacity gaps in donor organisations, but have been 
continuously discussed under the financial capacity gaps that post tsunami Sri Lanka is facing.  
When an NGO operates as an implementer for post tsunami recovery actions, most of the 
capacities required are connected with reconstruction work. The main problem identified by the 
interviewees in this regard is their incapacity to carry out relevant reconstruction work in some 
areas due to security issues. Due to the ethnic problem prevailing in Sri Lanka, some of the 
worst tsunami affected areas cannot be reached by the organisations who are carrying out the 
reconstruction work. This hinders the effectiveness of such programmes. Moreover, some 
interviewees commented that some of these organisations demonstrate poor communication and 
coordination capacities especially when maintaining the link between the government 
authorities and themselves. Since the same is visible within governmental organisations, these 
organisations need to monitor the situation carefully to overcome this issue. 
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While essential, identifying the main capacity gaps which hinder the post tsunami recovery 
attempts in Sri Lanka is just a starting point. As discussed above, most of these capacity gaps 
have roots in problems which go beyond the scope of disaster management. It is therefore the 
role of the parties involved to analyse these factors and gaps in detail prior to embarking on post 
tsunami recovery actions.         
4. Conclusions 
Identifying capacity gaps is an essential task for Sri Lanka to overcome the problems they face 
with their post tsunami recovery attempts. It is evident that the government had ambitious plans 
and high expectations for speedy recovery but with less success rate. The capacity gaps existing 
in various scales under various organisations and circumstances have been identified as 
influential factors limiting the success of post tsunami recovery actions in Sri Lanka. Among 
other factors, various skills shortages such as coordination and planning skills have been 
identified as main capacity gaps which need immediate attention. Further, some of these 
capacity gaps in skills have led to the country to demonstrate capacity gaps in human resources 
such as lack of construction professionals and skilled construction workers.  
In addition to the capacity gaps identified in general as above, institutions involved in the post 
tsunami reconstruction activities are also suffering from institutional capacity gaps. Among 
these, governmental institutions suffer from capacity gaps such as lack of central statistics and 
poor quality assurance. From the perspective of non-governmental organisations such as donor 
agencies and implementing organisations, a lack of coordination, security restrictions and policy 
issues have been identified as the main areas of concern. Dealing with donor organisations, 
unrealistic ambitions, rigid funding policies and lack of coordination with government 
organisations have been identified as issues which are needed to be addressed and at the same 
time as leading to financial capacity gaps that Sri Lanka is experiencing within the context of 
post tsunami recovery. 
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